About 700,000 Ukrainians remained within the territory of the post-war Poland, despite the fact of moving its eastern border to the Bug river. On 9 September 1944, following orders from Moscow, the communist controlled Polish Committee of National Liberation and the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic signed an agreement on population exchange. It covered Poles and Jews, former Polish citizens now living in Ukraine, and Ukrainians in Poland. According to the agreement the exchange of population was to be voluntary, in practice however both parties aimed at ridding their territories of the unwanted nation. On 15 October repatriation of the Ukrainian population from Poland began. Initially those to leave were people who had lost their relatives and property as a result of the Polish – Ukrainian fighting, or the front’s movement. The vast majority of Ukrainians, however, even despite earlier declarations wanted to stay in the hitherto inhabited territory, having treated it as their native Ukrainian soil and not wanting to leave, all the more so since Ukraine was not an independent state. One should add that they were called to remain in their current place of residence by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (that operated mainly in the western territories of the Soviet Ukraine) whose aim was to create an independent Ukrainian state. It was then that the authorities started to proclaim themselves in favour of forcing Ukrainians to leave Poland.

After initially encouraging Ukrainians (whom one cancelled all and any arrears, current services in kind, taxes and insurance premiums) to leave, the authorities started, first by means of administrative and economic methods, to force Ukrainians to leave. At the same time the number of security agencies’ and armed forces’ operations against Ukrainian population increased. For example: on 24 February 1945 Civic Militia officers attacked the village of Ruskie and murdered over 20 Ukrainians. On 21 March 1945 the 2nd Operational Battalion of Internal Security Corps pacified villages of Lubliniec Stary and Lubliniec Nowy, where at least 58 people were murdered. On 5 April the same battalion attacked the village of Gorajec (Lubaczów Poviat) and murder at least 155 people, including women and children. The village was robbed and burnt. Unfortunately, these criminal actions of some of the army, Civic Militia and Security Office were overlapped by the Polish and Ukrainian underground warfare whose victims, to a considerable extent, included civilian population, both Polish and Ukrainian. Total casualties inflicted by the Ukrainian underground movement on Poles in the years 1945 – 1947, according to official records, amounted to 2,199 killed, including 997 soldiers, 603 Security Office, Civic Militia and Voluntary Reserve of the Civic Militia officers, and 599 civilians. On the Ukrainian side, in turn, in the same period an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed by Poles.

In the middle of 1945 the repatriation operation broke down mainly as a result of being avoided by the Ukrainian population. In that situation, on 3 September 1945 3rd, 8th and 9th Infantry Division of the Polish Armed Forces were sent to the South-eastern Poland in order to repatriate Ukrainians. The Army resettled entire villages giving its inhabitants about 2 hours to get ready to leave. Operations were frequently accompanied by acts of brutality committed by soldiers. Here are a few examples: on 25 January 1946 34th Infantry Regiment pacified the village of Zawadka Morachowska. They repeated this operation on 28 March and 13 April 1946, killing over 96 people in total. On 9 July 1946 the party of 36th Command of Borderland Security Troops from Wołkowyja murdered 33 Ukrainians in the village of Terka, the majority of whom were burnt alive. By the end of June 1946 the units of Polish Armed Forces repatriated 236,799 people in total. Thus, since 15 October 1944 the total of 121,521 families (478,486 people) had been repatriated, which means that almost the entire Ukrainian population was removed to the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.

The repatriation operation also covered the Greek Catholic clergy, and was perceived by the government as, on the one hand, an opportunity to suppress this denomination, and on the other as a factor accelerating the Ukrainian population’s departure from Poland. We underline, however, that Polish government initiated its activities in this field after the Soviet authorities had started the suppression of that denomination in the USSR. Unlike Soviets, Poles did not try to legitimise the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church, since the government believed that the displacement of clergy and population would automatically solve that problem. On 26 June 1946 bishop Jozafat Kocyłowśki was arrested and subsequently handed over to the Soviet authorities. He was imprisoned in the Czapajiwka camp near Kiev, where as a result of physical and mental torture he died. The same happened to his suffragan bishop Hryhorij Łakota who died in 1951 in the Abas camp in Workuta. Researchers estimate that in the period from 1944 to 1946 at least 23 Greek Catholic priests were killed, and about 300 were displaced. Almost all monasteries, religious institutions and organisations were liquidated.

Repressive measures were also used against the Orthodox clergy in the territories inhabited by the Ukrainian population. Unfortunately, we cannot quote any figures here because thorough research into those issues has not been conducted yet. During deportation several priests lost their lives. Despite the protest of the Orthodox bishop Tymoteusz of Lublin some of the Orthodox clergy and members of the Consistory of Autocephalous Orthodox Church from Chełm were repatriated. The latter were removed by orders of the Chełm Starost, even though the superior authorities had recommended that the operation be discontinued. In 1946 one formally liquidated Orthodox Chełmsko-Podlaska and Krakowsko-Lemkowska dioceses. Like Greek Catholic churches, some of the Orthodox churches were demolished, and those vacated were exposed to deliberate or involuntary devastation. The Ukrainian congregation of the Polish Church of Evangelical Baptist Christians and the Methodist Church in Poland were repatriated, too.

Contrary to government’s expectations some of the Ukrainian population avoided displacement. Authorities intended to repatriate it to the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic but met with refusal of the Soviet authorities that agreed only to the repatriation of interested individuals as they feared that further mass influx of Ukrainians from Poland, who were treated as ideological foes due to their reluctance to migrate voluntarily, or their support for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), may strengthen the anticommunist opposition in the USSR. The existence of Ukrainian national minority, however, was at variance with the governments’ intention to transform Poland into the state of a single nation. It was then that the concept of the Ukrainian population’s deportation to western and northern territories of Poland started to come to the fore. In the light of documents preserved this project had two aims: one that was immediate, i.e. to liquidate the UIA parties through the displacement of population, and the other that was of a long-term nature, i.e. to finally solve the Ukrainian problem through the denationalisation of Ukrainians in a new place of settlement.

Preparations for the displacement of Ukrainian population to the western and northern territories of Poland began once the deportation of Ukrainians to the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic had come to an end, and they became particularly intensified at the beginning of 1947. In January the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces ordered its subordinate troops stationed in the South-eastern Poland to take a census of Ukrainian families still residing within that territory. In February 1947 in his report following inspections in Voivodeship Security Committees in Katowice, Cracow and Lublin Major General S. Mossor proposed, “to conduct in the spring an energetic operation of those people’s displacement, with individual families to be scattered across the Regained Territories where they will quickly assimilate.” Then on 27 March at the meeting of the National Security Commission he put forward a proposal to remove the Ukrainian population from Rzeszów Voivodeship. This proposal was accepted and forwarded to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of Polish Workers’ Party. On the same day a similar postulate was put forward by the Operational Department of the 3rd Section of the General Staff of Polish Armed Forces. One day later General Karol Świerczewski, Vice-minister of National Defence was killed in an ambush near Jabłonka under the circumstances that have as yet remained unexplained. His death that was blamed on the Ukrainian underground movement became a pretext, taken full advantage of by the government, to final solution of the Ukrainian problem in Poland. No wonder that on 29 March the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of Polish Workers’ Party resolved to deport the Ukrainian population to the western and northern territories of Poland.

On 28 April 1947 the Operational Group “Wisła” started to remove Ukrainians to the western and northern territories of Poland within the framework of “Wisła” operation. In practice the major effort related to the displacement of population rather than the liquidation of UIA parties. Displacement covered all Ukrainians and mixed families irrespective of the degree of loyalty to the Polish state. It did not spare former guerrilla or anti-nazi fighters, demobilised soldiers of the Red Army or the Polish Armed Forces. It also covered members of the people’s government machinery, members of the Polish Workers’ Party, as well as inhabitants of villages where parties of the UIA had never appeared. Voivodeship Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party in Lublin went as far as to demand that officers of the Poviat Public Security Office of Ukrainian nationality be repatriated.

Armed forces did not abide by the majority of recommendations contained in displacement instructions. Thus, the course of displacement depended on the commander’s decision. At dawn soldiers would envelop the village and order its inhabitants to prepare themselves to leave giving them about 2 hours for packing and collecting their essential belongings and livestock. It so happened that the repatriation squad reduced that time to 20 minutes. Such a short period of time for packing resulted in the fact that people could not take even the most essential things. Then came an acute shortage of means of transport. For this reason one horse-drawn wagon had to be shared by 2 or 3 families, and it so happened that the displaced had to carry their belongings on their backs or soldiers would limit the amount thereof to 25 kg per person. People were sent to the rallying point, and then to the loading station where inhabitants of one village were separated and carried by trains to various places in the western and northern territories of Poland. One can cite an example of Florynka village inhabitants who were settled in 30 villages across 6 poviats. From loading stations transports were sent via Katowice (Oświęcim) or Lublin to distribution stations (Szczecinek, Olsztyn, Poznań, Oleśnica) to destination stations. From there Ukrainian families were transported to locations within the adjacent area (poviat). Overloaded carriages and long travel under the supervision of soldiers, in dreadful sanitary conditions, as well as the accompanying stress caused death of at least 27 people during the journey. Transports bringing Ukrainian people to the western and northern territories of Poland had come regularly until 15 August 1947. After that date they would come irregularly until 1950. One may assume that within the framework of “Wisła” operation the total of 150,000 people were deported to the western and northern territories of Poland.

The symbol of repressive measures taken by the Polish authorities during “Wisła” operation became the Central Labour Camp in Jaworzno established on the basis of the former nazi concentration camp SS-Lager Dachsgrube, branch of the Auschwitz camp. Its detainees included Germans and Poles, and, on the strength of decision taken by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of PWP dated 23 April 1947, Ukrainians suspected of co-operation with the UIA, as well as the intellectuals and Ukrainian clergy. The total of 3,873 people were put in the camp, including 700 women and children, as well as 22 Greek Catholic priests, and 5 Orthodox priests. Detainees were subjected to severe physical and mental torture, as a result of which, and of malnutrition and diseases, at least 161 people died, including the Greek Catholic priest Julian Krynyćkyj. Those whose co-operation with the UIA was proven were handed over to the Military Court of the Operational Group “Wisła” that in the period of its operation sentenced 173 people to capital punishment, 58 to life imprisonment, 40 to 15 years in prison, 38 up to 15 years in prison, and acquitted 5 individuals. Proceedings were of a show trial nature and were given special publicity.

Deportation covered the Ukrainian clergy, as well. On the eve of the “Wisła” operation there were 114 Greek Catholic priests in Poland. Their fate was varied. 62 priest were deported together with their congregations to the western and northern territories. Seven priests were arrested and handed over to Soviets, whereas 22 were imprisoned in Jaworzno camp. Seven priests were sentenced to imprisonment, and one to capital punishment. At least three avoided displacement, while the rest left Poland, died during military operations, turned Roman Catholic, or left the priesthood. Although we have some fragmentary information rather than specifics we can say that a similar fate was that of Orthodox priests. The majority of them were deported together with their congregations, some were arrested and imprisoned, others remained in their current places, five were put in Jaworzno camp.

Ukrainians that had been deported and escorted under the supervision of soldiers were scattered before settlement, in accordance with some previously established rules, so that they did not form dense groups or exceed 10% of the village population. Authorities prohibited from locating Ukrainian families in the following zones: 50 km from land borders, 30 km from sea borders and voivodeship cities. Ministry of Public Security recommended that only one family of group A (being on the Security Office lists) or B (being on military lists) and up to five group C families (which in practice meant all other families) be settled in one village. A and B category families could not be settled together or with group C families. The same rules were applied while placing Ukrainians in state-owned properties. Ukrainian families were not allowed to leave their places of settlement or organise national, cultural or religious life for themselves. The purpose was to denationalise them.

Despite those prohibitions the Ukrainian population did begin to organise their cultural and educational, as well as religious life. This posed a threat to the government’s control over them, which was something that the government, in the totalitarian regime of those days, could not allow. Besides, authorities still received applications from Ukrainians who asked for permission to return home, and some of them decided on returning illegally. No wonder that the Party authorities resolved to subject the awakening Ukrainian movement to their supervision, which could only be achieved through an authoritative imposition of organisational forms. As of the beginning of 1952 one started to collect information on Ukrainians that was next, in April 1952, used by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of Polish United Workers’ Party for drafting and adopting a secret resolution regarding measures aimed at improving the economic situation of Ukrainian population and stimulating political activities among them. It imposed an obligation on lower party and administrative levels to take actions with a view to the enhanced settlement of Ukrainian population, and strict abidance by the provisions prohibiting them against leaving their farms. Local authorities were also ordered to consider a possibility of meeting cultural and educational needs of Ukrainians, and to stimulate political activity among them with a possibility of establishing local Ukrainian cultural associations. As regards religious aspects the instruction recommended normalisation of religious relations through supporting the loyal Orthodox clergy while simultaneously fighting “the Greek Catholic underground.” This resolution, however, did not produce satisfactory results, which followed from officials’ sluggishness resulting from their antipathy to Ukrainians, and from problems connected with winning their trust. Ukrainians themselves were rather sceptical about those activities, too.

The turning-point in the Ukrainian population’s life in Poland was the formation of the Ukrainian Social and Cultural Association (USCA) in June 1956 that engaged in the organisation of cultural and educational life of Ukrainians in Poland. Its formation and development coincided with political transformations taking place in Poland and the USSR, which was conducive to the social activation of Ukrainian population. One commonly demanded that the “Wisła” operation be fairly assessed; that land and real property left be restored; that home-coming be rendered possible; and that Greek Catholic services be allowed. The USCA’s role became more and more that of an advocate of the Ukrainian population interests in Poland. Ukrainian postulates were communicated to the Party and State authorities, and their fulfilment was requested. Ukrainian people believed in the promising future.

The government, however, was far from accepting independent activities of the USCA or other minority organisations. For this reason a Commission of the Central Committee of PUWP on National Minorities was appointed in January. Its task was to co-ordinate government activities relating to national minorities, and provide assistance to national minority organisations. In time, however, the Commission’s role was limited to imposing the implementation of party lines in ethnic policy on those associations. Let us add that the Commission’s activity decreased over time, and the Commission itself ceased to exist at the beginning of the seventies.

The Ukrainian population, however, was more and more articulate in voicing their postulates, especially those of returning to their former places of residence. Their pressure was so strong that the issue of home-coming became a priority for the USCA authorities. In April 1957 the Secretariat of the Central Committee of PUWP adopted a resolution regarding the strengthening of the Ukrainians’ settlement in the western and northern territories, and the regulation of individual and group home-comings. As regards the increased permanency of settlement the resolution provided for extensive financial help to be given to Ukrainians in the form of credits and construction assistance, and it announced intensified cultural and educational activity, as well as the development of educational system. The issue of home-coming, in turn, was to be handled by the Government’s Plenipotentiary for Neglected Territories Development commission. Moreover, the resolution recommended that the necessity of “Wisła” operation, as well as the impossibility of cancellation of the decree of 27 July 1949 (on the basis of which Ukrainians had been deprived of their property by the government) be explained to Ukrainians. Apart from that, it was ordered to counteract any signs of discrimination against Ukrainians. In practice, however, the authorities aimed at keeping Ukrainians in the western territories. The issue was finally solved on 12 March 1958, when the Sejm passed an Act on the sale of state-owned agricultural property and regulation of some other issues connected with the agricultural reform and agricultural settlement. Pursuant to this Act individuals whose farms had been taken over by the state could acquire farms only by way of purchase. What it meant in practice was the reduction of Ukrainian home-comings to individual cases.

Despite problems connected with Ukrainians’ settlement within the western and northern territories, and a strong tendency to return home the government continued to deny them its permission to migrate, as it was afraid that home-comings would lead to Ukrainians’ resettlement in rather dense and large groups. For the government it would mean the resignation from its idea of transforming Poland into the country of a single nation because Ukrainians would then much more effectively resist the assimilation process. It was only the scattering of Ukrainian population that was conducive to their quick Polonisation. Let us add that this intention was never abandoned by the Polish authorities, whereas the permission granted to Ukrainians to develop, under supervision, their cultural and educational life was just a modification in the Polonisation method, which Ukrainians were soon to find out. As early as June 1958, by government orders, S. Makuch, the chairman of the Central Board of USCA was dismissed for being too independent in running the organisation, and acting for the benefit of Ukrainians’ home-coming. Even the fact of his being the Party official did not rescue him. In July 1958 B. Szost was fired from his job at the Voivodeship Command of Civic Militia in Wrocław for acting for the benefit of the Ukrainian community. For the same reason M. Truchan, head of the prosecutor’s office in Wrocław was dismissed. His job in the Ministry of Internal Affairs also lost Colonel S. Sosna-Sarno for promoting the Ukrainian population’s home-coming.

USCA formation made it possible for the Ukrainian population to develop the Ukrainian educational system and cultural activity. The first Ukrainian language teaching points were established by the authorities in the 1952-53 school year. Despite considerable reluctance of local administrative and educational authorities, the Ukrainian educational system underwent a systematic development owing first of all to the efforts of local USCA workers. In the 1957-58 school year there were 3 primary schools (83 pupils), of which one was a boarding school, whereas in the subsequent year there were as many as 6 schools (218 pupils), including 2 boarding schools. In the 1959-1960 school year, in turn, these schools were attended by 236 pupils. In the 1956-57 school year the first form (53 students) was organised at the Pedagogical Secondary School in Bartoszyce. The next year there were as many as 4 secondary schools (290 students), including the Teachers College in Szczecin. In the 1959-60 school year the number of students attending those secondary schools increased to 298. As regards higher education, in the 1959-60 school year 6 students studied the Ukrainian philology at the University in Kiev, and 18 at the University in Warsaw. The vast majority of Ukrainian children, however, learnt their native language at teaching points whose number was systematically growing. In the 1956-57 school year there were 117 points attended by 1,308 students. The next year there were 151 points (2,359 students), in 1958-59: 183 points (2,781 students), and in the 1959-1960 school year there were as many as 210 points with 2,958 students.